Permit market auctions with allowance reserves by Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A.
 Accepted Manuscript
Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves
Peyman Khezr, Ian A. MacKenzie
PII: S0167-7187(18)30090-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.005
Reference: INDOR 2482
To appear in: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Received date: 5 February 2018
Revised date: 18 July 2018
Accepted date: 17 September 2018
Please cite this article as: Peyman Khezr, Ian A. MacKenzie, Permit Market Auctions
with Allowance Reserves, International Journal of Industrial Organization (2018), doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service
to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please
note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and
all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves∗
Peyman Khezra and Ian A. MacKenzie†a
aSchool of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia 4072
Abstract
This article investigates multi-unit uniform-price auctions with allowance reserves, where a fixed
quantity of units is supplemented by an additional supply reserve. The reserve automatically releases
units if a sufficiently high price is triggered. This mechanism is commonly used in pollution permit
auctions. The main justification for implementing an allowance reserve is to assist in cost containment.
We show—paradoxically—that incorporating an allowance reserve into a permit auction may increase
the clearing price. This has implications for all major cap-and-trade markets, including the US
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
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1 Introduction
Cap-and-trade markets are now a common regulatory instrument to control pollution. Behind this
enthusiastic adoption is the core economic rationale of least-cost pollution control: the aggregate costs of
pollution control are minimized by allowing firms to trade a fixed number of pollution permits. Although
regulation is apparently least-cost, current regulators have real concerns about the prohibitive costs to
industry. The potential for price volatility—and therefore increased (and uncertain) industry costs—has
placed the issue of cost containment at the center of policy debates (Tatsutani and Pizer, 2008). Many
regulators have implemented cost-containment procedures to reduce the equilibirum clearing price
and thereby reduce firms’ compliance costs to ensure strong industry support. One such mechanism is
the so-called allowance reserve, which provides the market with a fixed reserve of permits that can be
released if a threshold permit price is triggered (Murray, Newell, and Pizer, 2009).1 This mechanism is
now common practice in major cap-and-trade markets, which include the Cost Containment Reserve
(CCR) of the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
Within these cap-and-trade markets, a second structural change has been observed; the process of
initial permit allocation is moving away from free allocation towards auctioning. Until very recently, the
auctions that did exist tended to follow a very standard format: a uniform-price auction with a fixed
number of permits. Importantly, however, many of these auction formats have been modified to include
the existence of an allowance reserve. Thus in some schemes—such as RGGI—the auction system now
has endogenity in the supply of permits: firms’ bids can now activate the release of additional permits.2
Given the addition of an allowance reserve, it is a priori unclear how the auction equilibria will change.
Having an additional supply of permits realized on reaching a trigger price may have consequences for
firms’ equilibrium bidding strategies, revenue generation, and the functioning of the permit market.
1This is also known as a ‘soft’ price ceiling (Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern, and Palmer, 2012). Other cost containment
processes—such as ‘hard’ price ceilings and price collars—have also been considered. Cost containment can be established by
allowing offsets to enter the market as well as the introduction of banking and borrowing mechanisms (Fell and Morgenstern,
2010).
2This is also similar to the allowance reserve proposed in H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey Bill). Other schemes have subtle
differences. As documented in Fell (2015), the European Commission decided to: (i) ‘backload’ permits by reducing the
number of permits for sale at auction in Phase III of the scheme. Allowances were planned to be reduced by 400 million
in 2014, 300 million in 2015 and 200 million in 2016, as well as (ii) creating the Market Stability Reserve (MSR). The
MSR is triggered when the number of permits in circulation falls outside a pre-defined range. In particular, allowances are
added to the reserve (taken away from future auctions) if the total surplus of permits is higher than 833 million allowances.
Similarly, allowances are released from the reserve if the total surplus falls below 400 million allowances. In the Californian
Cap-and-Trade Program AB-32, the reserve can be sold to firms for a predetermined (three-tiered) price (Borenstein, Bushnell,
Wolak, and Zaragoza-Watkins, 2015; Khezr and MacKenzie, 2018).
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Given that both the auctioning of permits and the presence of an allowance reserve are prevalent in
contemporary cap-and-trade markets, it is important to consider how these two institutional structures
interact and the implications for cost containment.
In this article we investigate a permit auction under the presence of an allowance reserve. We model
a permit auction in which the supply of permits can be increased if the clearing price reaches a threshold
trigger price that is determined by the regulator. We provide firms’ equilibrium bidding strategies, as well
as the implications for the regulator’s revenue and auction clearing prices. We find the key determinants
of whether an allowance reserve is successful or not depends on the regulator’s choice of trigger price
and size of the allowance reserve. We find the inclusion of an allowance reserve may provide incentives
for “convergence” of the clearing price towards the trigger price. If the clearing price in a normal auction
is larger than the chosen trigger price then the introduction of an allowance reserve reduces the auction
clearing price to the trigger price, and the allowance reserve appears to work well. Yet if the clearing price
in a normal auction is lower than the trigger price and the size of the allowance is sufficiently large, then
the inclusion of an allowance reserve may actually increase clearing prices. Intuitively, the introduction
of an allowance reserve distorts firms’ demand schedules. Firms’ that have permit valuations larger
than the trigger price may have an incentive to submit higher bids in order to activate the allowance
reserve. Of course, the lower the trigger price (relative to firms’ permit values) and larger the size of the
allowance reserve will mean increased incentives to submit higher bids and consequently increase the
auction clearing price.
In our framework the regulator sets a reserve price, quantity of allowance reserve, and a threshold
trigger price: all three parameters are set prior to the auction and are common knowledge to all firms.
If the initial clearing price is larger than the trigger price, then the reserve quantity is released until
either the clearing price becomes equal to the trigger price or the whole reserve exhausts. To investigate
this, we advance the framework of a multi-unit uniform-price auction, where bidders simultaneously
submit their demand schedules. We initially assume firms are uncertain about the permit value, which
is common among them, but each firm receives a private signal about the common value. Although
the common value is a useful benchmark, we later relax these assumptions to allow for a private-value
setting. In all settings the regulator aggregates the demand schedules then determines a uniform clearing
price at the intersection of aggregate demand and supply. This core process is frequently used in the
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auctioning of financial securities, pollution permits, and energy products (Ausubel and Cramton, 2004).
The popularity of uniform-price auctions continues even though it is well known that they have inefficient
equilibria: bidders’ optimal strategies may result in a reduction of their actual demand functions and
consequently the clearing price is lower than the equivalent Walrasian equilibrium price (e.g., Wilson,
1979; Back and Zender, 1993; Wang and Zender, 2002; Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka,
2014).
The majority of literature on multi-unit auctions focuses on fixed supply, yet a small sub-field now
considers variable supply (Hansen, 1988; Lengwiler, 1999; Back and Zender, 2001; LiCalzi and Pavan,
2005; McAdams, 2007; Montero, 2008; Damianov and Becker, 2010). Although this sub-field of literature
allows the auction supply to vary, the choice of quantity is generally unrestricted and is often chosen to
maximize the seller’s payoff. In contrast to this literature, we provide an alternative framework with two
distinct features. First, in our setting the reserve quantity for sale is restricted due to policy (and political)
design. Thus, unlike the existing literature, the choice of additional supply cannot be determined after
the bids have been submitted. Second, the additional supply is based on conditionality: the additional
quantity will only be released for a sufficiently large aggregate demand schedule.3 We therefore provide
the first analysis of a multi-unit uniform-price auction with a trigger price and fixed reserve. Using our
framework, we provide a paradoxical result; namely, introducing an allowance reserve may actually
increase the price of permits. As many permit auctions are used for their price-discovery benefits, this
distortion has the potential to generate incorrect price signals to market participants.4
Our model has similar structural characteristics to the auction process of the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI).5 This market incorporates 9 Northeastern US states and controls greenhouse gases
emitted from the power sector. Since its inception in 2008, quarterly auctions (with a reserve price)
have initially allocated the permits. From the beginning of 2014, the auction mechanism was augmented
3For instance, these distinctions are clear when we contrast our approach to the work of LiCalzi and Pavan (2005), where
the seller can precommit to a continuous and increasing supply schedule in order to promote aggressive bidding and, as a
result, improve expected revenue. In order to model contemporary permit markets, we model a novel supply schedule: we
allow for a vertical supply (rather than increasing supply) that may shift to the right in order to release the allowance reserve if
a high enough price is triggered. This is significant because, as shown in our Theorem 1, the equilibrium clearing price cannot
go above the trigger price while in LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) any price below the common value can constitute an equilibrium.
4As explained by Ellerman, Joskow, Schmalensee, Montero, and Bailey (2000), the use of annual US EPA auctions for the
Acid Rain Program helped to stimulate the permit market by generating early price signals, which could be used to assist
in bilateral trade as well as providing new entrants with a secure method of permit allocation. Further evidence has been
provided—for a range of auction types—that show permit auction clearing prices track underlying market conditions accurately
(Burtraw, Goeree, Holt, Myers, Palmer, and Shobe, 2010).
5For the preliminary auction design of RGGI see Holt, Shobe, Burtraw, Palmer, and Goeree (2007).
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Table 1: RGGI auction results 2014-2015.
Auction Permits
offered
CCR volume released
(% of reserve)
Clearing price in $ per
allowance
Auction 30 (Q4 2015) 15,374,274 0 $7.50
Auction 29 (Q3 2015) 15,374,294 10,000,000 (100%) $6.02
Auction 28 (Q2 2015) 15,507,571 0 $5.50
Auction 27 (Q1 2015) 15,272,670 0 $5.41
Auction 26 (Q4 2014) 18,198,685 0 $5.21
Auction 25 (Q3 2014) 17,998,687 0 $4.88
Auction 24 (Q2 2014) 18,062,384 0 $5.02
Auction 23 (Q1 2014) 18,491,350 5,000,000 (100%) $4.00
Source: Adapted from: https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results
to include a Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) (RGGI, 2013). Initially the allowance reserve was set at 5
million permits then increased and sustained at 10 million permits each year thereafter (the allowance
reserve is not transferable between years). The auction trigger price required to release the permits was
initially set at $4 per CO2 allowance in 2014 and $6 per CO2 allowance in 2015. The trigger price then
increased to $8 and $10 per CO2 allowance for the years 2016 and 2017, respectively, and increases
by 2.5% per annum thereafter. As can be seen from Table 1, the CCR has been fully exhausted in two
auctions with the clearing prices fitting our predictions. The question then arises: how effective is the
allowance reserve in controlling prices within the auction mechanism?
An extensive debate exists over the effectiveness of allowance reserves. Proponents of these allowance
reserves show that, under the presence of uncertainty, allowance reserves reduce the net present value
of compliance costs. In particular Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern, and Palmer (2012) shows, by using a
stochastic dynamic framework, that an expansion of an allowance reserve reduces net present value
of control costs, but at a diminishing rate.6 Further, on investigating the reserve within the EU-ETS,
Fell (2015) finds that a reserve can help stabilize permit allocation price levels in a more cost-effective
manner than scheduled permit allocation reductions.7 Due to the lowering of the net present value of
6An important design issue is the source of permits within the allowance reserve. It is clear that, holding demand constant,
if the permits are sourced from the current cap, then clearing prices may rise under the presence of an allowance reserve
(Schatzki, 2012). Yet as this article proves, demand schedules endogenously change due to the inclusion of an allowance
reserve. Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2009) suggests permits can be sourced from future caps (“system borrowing”) or allowing
them to vanish if not used (thus establishing a range of potential long term caps).
7Recently, however, Perkis, Cason, and Tyner (2016), Shobe, Holt, and Huetteman (2014), and Holt and Shobe (2016)
conducted laboratory experiments and found that ‘soft’ ceilings often did not perform well.
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compliance costs, it has thus been argued—from a political economy perspective—that an allowance
reserve “may be able to bridge differences between environmental advocates seeking a cap on emissions
and industrial interests concerned about costs” (Murray, Newell, and Pizer, 2009, p. 90). From this
perspective, then, the concept of a reserve has been developed as a politically viable version of a ‘hard’
price collar (safety valve) (Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn, 2010; Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Grüll and
Taschini, 2011; Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern, and Palmer, 2012).8 Yet there continues to be a controversial
debate over the use of a reserve. For example, Borenstein, Bushnell, Wolak, and Zaragoza-Watkins (2014,
pp. 86-88) argues—in the context of the California AB-32 market—that in order to fully control price
volatility the regulator should, instead, be ready to expand the reserve in order to limit the clearing price
(akin to having a ‘hard’ price ceiling).9
Throughout this debate, attention has—justifiably—focused on the ability of the allowance reserve to
dampen price rises and aggregate compliance costs within the permit market. As such it has abstracted
from the complex interactions between the allowance reserve and the auction mechanism. Yet given that
auctions provide a major component of information dissemination (such as price discovery) within the
market, it is important to consider the potential impact of an allowance reserve. In this article, then, we
address this gap by focusing our attention on how an allowance reserve has the potential to alter the
auction equilibria.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we establish a novel auction framework that incorporates an
allowance reserve with a trigger price. We add to the literature by incorporating an auction supply
mechanism that is both limited in size and has the characteristics of conditionality. This, therefore,
extends the scope and potential applicability of multi-unit auctions with endogenous supply. Second,
we advance the policy debate on allowance reserves by critically evaluating the potential consequences
of a reserve within a permit auction. This article, then, provides the first theoretical analysis of this
connection. We are thus able to suggest potential auction design improvements for existing cap-and-trade
markets that incorporate allowance reserves.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a formal model of the auction mechanism
8Hybrid approaches were first analyzed by Roberts and Spence (1976) and developed by Pizer (2002). Recent approaches
on price controls have incorporated issues relating to strategic behavior (Stocking, 2012) and compliance (Holland and Moore,
2013; Hasegawa and Salant, 2014).
9For an analysis of price volatility within the California AB-32 market see Borenstein, Bushnell, Wolak, and Zaragoza-Watkins
(2015) and for a discussion of the issues involved within permit auction design see Lopomo, Marx, McAdams, and Murray
(2011).
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with and without an allowance reserve. In Section 3 we detail the relative merits and drawbacks of
an allowance reserve within a permit auction. Section 4 extends the model to a private-values setting.
Section 5 provides some policy implications for the RGGI auctions. Section 6 provides some concluding
remarks. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The basic model
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a cap-and-trade market that consists of an index set of firms I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The regulator
of this market has an aggregate emissions target of Q ∈ R+ and initially allocates a corresponding number
of pollution permits via a uniform-price auction.10 Suppose the marginal value of permits v is unknown
to firms but known to be within the support [v, v¯].11 Each firm i receives a private signal si for the value
of permits. Signals are independent and private with a common distribution G(.). This assumption is
made for tractability of the analysis, however we show later in the article (Section 4) that our main
results still hold when firms have independent private valuations for permits.
The regulator sells the Q permits via a uniform-price sealed-bid auction with a reserve price r > 0.
Similar to existing cap-and-trade markets, the regulator also has an allowance reserve of permits, which
can be released to the auction if the clearing price reaches a certain threshold. Formally, denote the
allowance reserve as Q˘ ≡ Q¯−Q > 0, where Q¯ is the maximum supply of permits. The regulator commits
to the following permit supply schedule: if the clearing price is higher than a trigger price, denoted p˜,
then the regulator releases more permits (up to Q˘ > 0) in order to reduce the market-clearing price
towards p˜.
Our auction game is structured as follows. First, the regulator announces {Q, Q¯, p˜, r}. Second, firms
submit permit demand schedules. There are two possible scenarios that can occur: (i) the clearing price
10As our focus here is on how existing institutional auction designs affect participating firms, we abstract from the regulator’s
objective function. We do, however, provide analysis of revenue maximization later in the article.
11The marginal value can be interpreted as either the expected price on the secondary market or the avoided marginal costs
of reducing pollution. For the former interpretation, firms have an expectation of the secondary market permit price, say
due to their estimates of emissions growth and knowledge of the regulatory framework. For the latter interpretation, we can
follow the realistic construction of marginal abatement costs (e.g., Mckinsey and Company, 2016) and assume that firms have
long-run marginal abatement cost curves that are globally convex but discontinuous because of alternative technology classes
that increase in (marginal) cost. In other words, the marginal abatement cost function is a step function where marginal costs
are constant for specific technology classes but discontinuously jump when adopting new technologies.
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is p∗ ≤ p˜ and (ii) the clearing price p∗ > p˜. In the first case, all bids higher than the clearing price would
receive their submitted quantities and pay p∗: the allowance reserve is not utilized. In the second case,
the regulator releases more permits until either the clearing price becomes equal to p˜ or the whole extra
permits exhausts.
2.2 An auction mechanism without an allowance reserve
Each firm i ∈ I submits a demand schedule di(p, v(si)) : [r,∞) → [0,Q], which is decreasing
and left continuous. The aggregate demand is the sum of individual demand functions, such that
D(p,v) =
∑n
i=1 di(p, v(si)), where v is the vector of all valuations. Given demand schedules and a
quantity of permits Q for sale in auction, the clearing price is
p∗ = max
§
p|D(p)≥Q; p ≥ r
ª
. (1)
If there is no price higher than r that satisfies the above condition, then the clearing price becomes the
reserve price r. In this case, at least some of the total supply of permits will not be allocated. Now
it is possible that the aggregate demand becomes discontinuous or flat at some points including p∗.
If the demand is flat at p∗ then we have excess demand at the clearing price and the extra demand
must be rationed. In particular, a discontinuity in each firm’s demand at any price p can be defined by
∆di(p, v(si))≡ di(p, v(si))− limp′↓p di(p′, v(si)), where p′ is any price greater than p. Aggregating over
all firms determines this discontinuity for the total demand schedule, which we denote by∆D(p,v)≡∑n
i=1∆di(p, v(si)). Using this we can derive firm i’s permit allocation,
q∗i (p∗,v) = di(p∗, v(si))−
 
D(p∗,v)−Q∆di(p∗, v(si))
∆D(p∗,v) . (2)
Firm i’s equilibrium initial allocation of permits equals their permits received from their individual
demand schedule at the clearing price di(p∗, v(si)) minus the pro rata reduction of permits due to excess
demand (if any). That is, the ratio on the right hand side is the total excess demand (D(p∗,v) −Q)
multiplied by the proportion of discontinuity (excess demand) for firm i relative to all firms ∆di(p
∗,v(si))
∆D(p∗,v) .
Given the clearing price and the equilibrium quantity, each firm pays the total amount of p∗q∗i for all
8
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permits received. Therefore, the payoff function for firm i ∈ I , given a clearing price p∗, is
pii = (v − p∗)q∗i . (3)
We first begin by analyzing the equilibrium demand schedules when the supply of permits is fixed
at the level Q. For a fixed supply of permits, if the regulator sets a reserve price r ≤ v, then there are
equilibria of the uniform-price auction in which the regulator could do the same by canceling the auction
and setting a fixed price v for all units (Back and Zender, 1993). To avoid such equilibria we focus on
those cases with r > v. The following proposition is adapted from Back and Zender (1993).
Proposition 1 (Back and Zender (1993)). For any price p∗ ∈ [r, v], there is a symmetric pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium with a clearing price p∗ in which firms have the following demand schedule,
di(p) =

0 if p > p†,
Q (p
†−p)
n(p†−p)+p−p∗ if p∗ < p ≤ p†,
Q
n−1 if r ≤ p ≤ p∗,
(4)
where p† = (n−1)v¯n +
p∗
n and each firm receives
Q
n permits.
Proposition 1 suggests that there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices that can lie between the
reserve price and v. There are some notable points about this result. First, as shown in Back and Zender
(1993), this class of equilibria is independent of bidders private signals. Second, since any price between
[r, v] could characterize an equilibrium with the same final permit allocation Qn , any rational firm prefers
to pay less.12 Therefore, the most likely prediction is the lowest possible price, that is, the reserve price
r. In fact, a clearing price equal to r is Pareto dominant equilibrium for all firms. The last point raises a
major concern for those auctions without a reserve price (or a small reserve price) as the clearing price
can potentially end up very low. We now turn to consider how these classes of equilibria change when a
regulator implements an allowance reserve.
12Our aim in this article is to focus on the consequences for the clearing price when an allowance exists, as such our focus is
not on the individual firm permit allocation. If it was, then it would be possible to incorporate financial capacity constraints for
all firms, which would generate asymmetric post-auction permit holdings.
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2.3 An auction mechanism with an allowance reserve
Suppose the regulator announces their target level Q of permits for the auction followed by the
commitment to increase the supply with the allowance reserve Q˘ if the clearing price is greater than
p˜. This mechanism design is similar to the mechanism within the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI). One clear observation is that if p˜ is greater than or equal to v, nothing will change: firms would
never pay a price above their marginal valuations. From this point forward we suppose p˜ < v unless it is
explicitly stated otherwise.
p
Q
(a)
D(p)
Q
p∗
p˜
0 Q¯
p
Q
(b)
D(p)
Q
p∗ = p˜
0 Q¯
p
Q
(c)
D(p)
Q
p∗
p˜
0 Q¯
Figure 1: Aggregate submitted demand and the allowance reserve
As shown in Figure 1 we have the aggregate demand D(p) and the auction supply of permits, which
includes the allowance reserve from Q to Q¯. Given the permits Q and the allowance reserve, a clearing
price exists at p∗. There are three possibilities for where p˜ lies with respect to p∗. In Figure 1(a), if p∗ is
below p˜ then no further supply would be released and firms with bids higher than the clearing price
would receive their permits and pay p∗. If p∗ is above p˜, two cases are possible. In Figure 1(b), the
quantity of permits sold in the auction increases to a point within the interval [Q, Q¯] and the clearing
price becomes p˜. In Figure 1(c), the quantity of permits sold will increase to Q¯ (the reserve is fully
exhausted) but the reserve quantity is not enough to reduce the clearing price to p˜ and the clearing price
becomes greater than p˜. This illustrates the potential complexity of this supply scheme.
We now provide an equilibrium characterization of the auction with allowance reserve.
Theorem 1. Suppose the regulator commits to a pair (r, p˜) such that, r < p˜ < v, and a supply of Q permits
which can increase up to Q¯ >Q, if the initial clearing price is greater than p˜. For any price p∗ ∈ [r, p˜] there
10
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
exists a symmetric pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the final clearing price is p∗ and each
firm has the following demand schedule:
di(p) =

0 if p > ¯¯v,
Q¯
n
(n−1)v¯+p∗∗−np
(n−1)v¯+p−np if p∗∗ < p ≤ ¯¯v,
Q†
n if p˜ ≤ p ≤ p∗∗,
Q
n
(n−1)v¯+p∗−np
(n−1)v¯+p−np if p∗ < p < p˜,
Q
n−1 if r ≤ p ≤ p∗,
(5)
where Q† = Q +λ(Q¯−Q) with λ ∈ (0, 1], ¯¯v is the highest price in which buyers have positive demand, and
p∗∗ is the maximum price in which the allowance reserve permits are enough to reduce the clearing price to
p˜. Also firm i receives Qn if p
∗ < p˜ and Q¯n if p∗ = p˜.
Theorem 1 characterizes a continuum of equilibria that includes any clearing price between [r, p˜].
There are numerous demand functions that can characterize equilibria like the one in (5). In fact, one can
show any decreasing left continuous function γ(p) with γ(p∗∗) = Q¯n , can characterize similar symmetric
equilibria as long as the residual supply left for a bidder is flat enough for prices greater than p∗∗ and
steep enough for prices lower than p∗∗, where p∗∗ is the maximum price in which the allowance reserve
can reduce the clearing price to p˜.
The key result in Theorem 1 is that, in equilbrium, if the allowance reserve is utilized then it must
be completelty exhausted. This is intuitive: once the reserve is activated, the price does not change
until the whole reserve is finished. Thus firms are better off at a point where all the reserve is used
compared to any other points where the reserve is partially used. One implication of Theorem 1 is that
the introduction of an allowance reserve can incentivize firms to increase the auction clearing price.
Comparing Theorem 1 with Proposition 1 highlights the structural differences when an allowance reserve
is incorporated into the auction. As shown in Back and Zender (1993), without an allowance reserve
the lowest equilibrium price—the reserve price—is the Pareto dominant equilibrium for the bidders.
However, with the introduction of an allowance reserve this is no longer the case. In fact, firms may
have incentives to increase bids in order to release the extra units.
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Theorem 1 also proves that p∗ > p˜ cannot constitute an equilibrium in the current setting. That is,
the situation depicted in Figure 1(c) cannot be an equilibrium. To see the intuition behind this result
first consider that firms divide the bidding scenarios into two cases: one where the allowance reserve is
not released, and the other where the allowance is released. In the first case everything is similar to the
standard uniform-price auction. However, in the second case, once they bid for the extra units, they
won’t let the price go any higher than p˜. In fact, there are no incentives for firms to bid any larger than
price p∗∗ as this is the highest value that reduces the price to p˜ on release of the allowance reserve.13
According to Theorem 1, each firm i receives Qn for p
∗ < p˜ and Q¯n for p∗ = p˜. The implication of
this result is significant. This shows that—in any equilibria—if we observe a clearing price of p˜ then
it is the case that all the extra quantity is used. Indeed, in all other equilibria, the allowance reserve
is left completely unused with a clearing price below p˜. Consider, for a moment, the observable real
world outcomes of the RGGI auctions with an allowance reserve. As we have seen in Table 1, Auction 23
(Q1 2014) and 29 (Q3 2015) resulted in the CCR being released. In both cases, the CCR was entirely
exhausted and the clearing price is in line with our predictions (i.e., equal to the trigger price). This
is, in a sense, good news for the regulator: the aim of the allowance reserve is to prevent prices being
greater than p˜. However, as we will prove in Section 3, obtaining this target via an allowance reserve is
not necessarily desirable. The result in Theorem 1 gives us an important clue to analyze when there is a
higher chance of observing a clearing price equal to p˜ or below.
3 Evaluating the relative merits of allowance reserves in permit auctions
In this section we compare the outcomes of auctions with and without an allowance reserve. We
begin analyzing if the auction with an allowance reserve and trigger price could potentially reduce the
clearing price of permits, given the current setting. As our aim is to consider how the existing institutional
auction design may affect firms, there is no requirement to model the objective function of the regulator.
Indeed, in reality, it is unclear as to the regulator’s objective. There can be a host of possible objectives,
for example, to maximize revenue (to provide public goods or in the case of RGGI, energy efficiency
13It is important to mention that since p˜ is exogenous and is set by the regulator without the knowledge of v it can be set
greater than v. Thus Theorem 1 shows that the use of allowance reserves may lower the upper bound of the clearing prices to
p˜. However, note that based on the result in Back and Zender (1993) we know that it is very unlikely to reach an upper bound
of the equilibrium clearing prices in a uniform-price auction. Consequently, the overall effect of the allowance reserve is more
in favor of an increase in price rather than a decrease.
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schemes), to maximize social welfare, improve allocative efficiency or to simply contain permit prices
(e.g., Cramton and Kerr, 2002). To provide some highlight, we do consider the optimal auction design
for a regulator that is concerned about revenue maximization.
3.1 Cost containment
The primary goal of an allowance reserve is to dampen any substantial price increases within a
cap-and-trade market. Due to unexpected cost shocks in the economy, the permit market may experience
levels of increased price volatility and potentially higher levels of compliance costs. Our purpose in this
subsection is to consider the implications of the allowance reserve on the permit clearing price within the
auction. To do this we want to compare the clearing prices when they can obtain Q permits without an
allowance versus an allowance reserve that first distributes Q then Q˘ if the initial clearing price reaches
the trigger price.14
The following proposition shows that, in many cases, the allowance reserve actually increases the
permit clearing price.
Proposition 2. If the clearing price of a uniform-price auction, p∗ with Q units is less than p˜ then the
introduction of an allowance reserve may increase the clearing price to p˜. If the clearing price of a uniform-
price auction is larger than p˜, then the introduction of an allowance reserve could reduce the clearing price
to p˜.
Proposition 2 shows that the introduction of an allowance reserve may increase the auction clearing
price. This is intuitive: if the value is large enough, firms would be encouraged to increase their bids and
release the extra units to improve their overall payoffs. Later, in Proposition 3, we show the conditions
under which firms would always prefer an equilibrium with higher prices. Also if the initial clearing
price is higher than p˜, the allowance reserve reduces the clearing price to p˜ (this is clear from Theorem
1). This aligns with the policymaker’s objective of dampening high permit prices. Finally, note that if p˜ is
too high (i.e., higher than the value), then the introduction of an allowance reserve does not have any
effects on the auction clearing price.
14In Khezr and MacKenzie (2016) we consider the alternative comparison of a target level Q¯. Within this comparison it can
be shown that there exists a class of symmetric equilibria in which the auction without an allowance reserve is Pareto superior
for firms relative to the auction with an allowance reserve.
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To see the logic behind Proposition 2, consider a firm’s equilibrium payoff function (v − p∗)q∗i with
clearing price p∗ < p˜ in an auction without an allowance reserve. Now consider the introduction of an
allowance reserve. If the initial clearing price is larger than p˜ the extra units will be released to the
auction. Compared to the previous case, the first term (v − p∗) will decrease but this may be offset by a
sufficiently large increase in permits from the allowance reserve and an increase in the second term. It
follows that if the allowance reserve is sufficiently large, relative to the size of Q, then clearing prices may
increase. This may be the case in RGGI as the Cost Containment Reserve is the size of Q˘ = 10m permits
while initial supply is only Q ≈ 15m permits (and decreasing annually), which means the allowance
reserve is becoming relatively larger year-on-year.
3.2 Clearing prices and maximizing auction revenue
The regulatory objective of controlling the permit price is clearly important for the development
of cap-and-trade markets. Yet the generation (and maximization) of auction revenue is also another
objective that we must consider. Indeed, the generation of periodic and stable revenue is becoming
increasingly important: one can observe from many permit markets that auction revenues are earmarked
to provide investment in new clean technologies and energy efficiency programs (see, for example, RGGI,
2015). The next proposition characterizes a condition under which the regulator could guide the clearing
price to either the trigger price or the reserve price with and without the allowance reserve.
Proposition 3. If r > v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜) then there exists a class of symmetric equilibria where:
• in the auction with an allowance reserve the clearing price p˜ is Pareto superior for firms,
• in the auction without an allowance reserve the clearing price of r is Pareto superior for firms.
Proposition 3 shows the condition under which, within a given class of equilibria, firms prefer the
equilibrium that has the highest price with an allowance reserve and prefer the equilibrium with the
lowest price without an allowance reserve. Given the condition for Proposition 3 mostly depends on the
regulator’s parameter choices, it suggests the regulator can implement {r, p˜,Q, Q¯} in such a way—even
with incomplete information on v—that encourages firms to increase their submitted demands in an
auction with an allowance reserve.
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The above result investigates the conditions where the regulator—by choice of an appropriate reserve
price—can generate a larger clearing price with the inclusion of an allowance reserve. This result,
however, can be interpreted from a broader perspective. As in most permit auctions, the reserve price
(and any per annum increase) is usually fixed at the beginning of auction design. For example under
RGGI the reserve price was set at the outset and increases at 2.5% per annum indefinitely. In absence
of any routine review process, there will exist inertia within the regulatory system, where the value of
reserve price is not always desirable.15 Thus it is feasible that the inequality r > v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜) may hold
due to adjustments and shocks to v (and its bounds [v, v¯]) rather than deliberate regulatory design. Thus
it is perfectly feasible to observe higher clearing prices when an allowance reserve is implemented simply
by the existence of an ‘unresponsive’ reserve price. For the RGGI application, the 2018 variables are
p˜ = $10.25 per CO2 allowance, r = $2.20 per CO2 allowance, Q˘ = 10 million allowances, and Q ≈ 15
million allowances. Thus using the above inequality, shows that if v¯ > $22.26 per CO2 allowance then
the results in Proposition 3 hold. This, in the current institutional context, is quite plausible.
Although the choice of reserve price is the most obvious transmission mechanism that alters the
clearing price, the regulator can also adjust the allowance reserve without changing the maximum level
of permits Q¯.
Corollary 1. For any positive quantity Q¯ and p˜ < v¯, the regulator can adjust the size of the allowance
reserve such that r > v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜).
Corollary 1 shows the importance of the allowance reserve level, or the ratio of Q¯Q , in this environment.
In fact, if the regulator wants to maximize revenue, it—only with the adjustment of the reserve quantity—
can generate the conditions for a larger clearing price. Again, using the RGGI application for the 2018
parameters, it can be easily shown that the regulator can obtain the desired outcome if Q¯Q >
v¯−2.20
v¯−10.25 . As
the current ratio is Q¯Q ≈ 1.67, it is quite plausible that the results in Corollary 1 could hold in this context.
3.2.1 Optimal trigger price
One of the key instruments in the current setting is the trigger price. In fact, in reality, trigger prices
may be more adjustable than any other variable from the regulator’s perspective. An interesting question
15Review processes, of course, exist but inertia will continue until the process is complete and recommendations are
implemented. Even then, market conditions will continually alter.
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is what would be the optimal trigger price if the regulator wanted to maximize revenue? Although
there are several possibilities for the equilibrium clearing price in the current setting, we use a max-min
approach to identify the optimal trigger price. In particular, we consider the worst possible clearing
price in the event that the extra supply is not released and then maximize the seller’s objective function.
When the extra supply is released there is only one equilibrium clearing price which is p˜. Also note that
the regulator does not know the value for permits. Suppose the regulator only knows that the value is
distributed according to some continuous distribution function F(.) with the support [v, v¯].
The following proposition characterizes an optimal trigger price, given the current reserve allowance
scheme.
Proposition 4. Suppose the regulator’s objective is to maximize revenue under the reserve allowance scheme.
Then the optimal trigger price is the one that satisfies
1− F(M)
f (M)
= M , (6)
where M = Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
.
Proposition 4 shows that to maximize revenue the optimal trigger price should be set such that
the allowance reserve Q˘ is equal to the hazard rate, where M = Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
. Note that from RGGI 2018
parameters (Q = 15, Q˘ = 10, r = 2.20). In order to calibrate the model suppose that v¯ = $25 per
ton of CO2 allowance and v is distributed uniformly on [0, 25], then the optimal trigger price becomes
p˜ ≈ $10.25. Thus, it is feasible that the actual optimal trigger price in RGGI is maximizing the regulator’s
auction revenue. Here we fix a reserve price and derive the optimal condition for the trigger price. Now,
however, consider a case where the trigger price is set together with the reserve price to maximize the
regulator’s revenue.
Proposition 5. Suppose the regulator’s objective is to maximize revenue under the reserve allowance scheme,
then the reserve price must be set equal to the trigger price, and the condition in (6) becomes,
p˜ =
1− F(p˜)
f (p˜)
. (7)
Proposition 5 is intuitive. First, the reserve price cannot be larger than the trigger price. Second, as
the reserve price increases then the higher the chance that the extra quantity would be released and
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the clearing price becomes the trigger price. Therefore, a reserve price equal to the trigger price is the
optimal choice of the regulator to increase revenue.16 This result appears to be out of line with the
experiences in RGGI. Note that both the reserve price and the trigger price were set at different stages of
the regulation process: the reserve price was set at the creation of the scheme and the trigger price was
chosen approximately seven years later. Thus, in this case, Proposition 4 provides the realistic experience
of RGGI where the trigger price is set given a fixed reserve price.
4 Private values
In this section we advance the benchmark model to a situation where firms have private values for
the permits they demand. In particular, suppose each firm i has a value vi for every unit of permit. Values
are private information of each firm, but the distribution of values F(.) is common knowledge.
First, let us discuss some existing results for the equilibrium analysis of the uniform-price auction.
Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka (2014) show, when firms have private values, the uniform-
price auction results in inefficient outcome (Theorem 1). Therefore, in any undominated equilibrium of
the uniform-price auction, firms bid lower than their values for at least some of the units they demand.
This is equivalent to the demand reduction result provided by Back and Zender (2001) in Section 2 but
in a more general setup. Also note that none of the existing literature provides a clear analysis of the
equilibrium bidding behavior in a private-value setting. This is mainly due to technical difficulties that
arise due to the fact that each firm has a private and different maximization problem.17
As mentioned before, the allowance reserve could potentially change the strategic behavior of firms
in a uniform-price auction. In what follows, we are going to show the implication of an allowance reserve
on the equilibrium behavior of firms for a private valuation setup. Recall that the main justification for
an allowance reserve is to dampen price increases. In other words, if the price of permits were to be high
enough with the standard cap, the allowance reserve is supposed to reduce this price to a lower level.
However, what we show next is contrary. In particular, the next proposition shows that the allowance
16Equation (7) is the same as the optimal reserve price in a standard auction. In fact, if the trigger price is set to maximize
the revenue, it must be equal to the optimal reserve price. Regarding Equation (6), M is in fact the weighted marginal revenue
of the regulator when they sell all the units at the trigger price compared to selling only Q units at the reserve price. The
regulator’s revenue is maximized at a point where the reserve price is equal to the trigger price.
17While these problems are often analytically intractable, substantial progress has been made in applying strategies from
numerical methods to obtain approximate solutions (Hubbard and Paarsch, 2014). Indeed, an interesting direction of future
research is using these methods to extend the results of this article.
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reserve may only increase the clearing price of an auction even with a private-value setting.
Proposition 6. Consider any undominated equilibrium of the uniform-price auction with a clearing price
lower than p˜. The introduction of an allowance reserve into the auction may increase the equilibrium
clearing price.
Proposition 6 shows that even within a private-value setting, there continues to be price increases
when p∗ < p˜, similar to the main model presented earlier in this article. The intuition for this result is
similar: a firm’s sufficiently large permit valuation may provide incentives to increase the clearing price
that reduces (vi − p) but increases q∗i proportionally more. Note that if the clearing price was above p˜
then it is ambiguous as to how the introduction of allowance reserve affects the price. This occurs as it is
not possible to perform an analysis similar to Theorem 1 because the equilibrium bidding functions are
unclear. For instance, once we introduce the allowance reserve, even if the initial clearing price was
above p˜, firms with high values may adjust their bids in order to achieve higher shares at a similar price.
On the other hand, they may also prefer to sacrifice a share in order to pay a lower price. Thus with the
introduction of an allowance reserve, prices can change in both directions. What is clear, however, is this
suggests that the benefits of an allowance reserve may be less certain in a private-value setting.
5 Policy implications: RGGI auction prices
In this section we further relate our results and predictions to the US Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI). As discussed earlier in this article, RGGI has a similar structure to what we have
modeled here. In fact, it can be readily stated that for 2018: p˜ = $10.25 per CO2 allowance, Q˘ = 10
million allowances, and r = $2.20 per CO2 allowance. Figure 2 provides the reserve and clearing prices
for all 39 RGGI auctions from 2008-2018 (inclusive). Also, as indicated in Figure 2, the Cost Containment
Reserve (CCR) was established after Auction 22. As can be observed from Figure 2, the clearing price
was identical to the reserve price from Auction 9 to 18 (inclusive). In many of these cases there was
excess supply of permits in the auction. However, there did exist instances in which the clearing price
was equal to the reserve with no excess supply (for example, auction 11). Our analysis appears to be
consistent when the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) was established: when the CCR was activated, the
entire reserve was exhausted and the clearing price was consistent with the regulator’s threshold trigger
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price (Theorem 1).
Figure 2: Auction clearing prices for RGGI
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Note that from Figure 2 a dramatic increase in the price of permits was observed from Auction
21 onwards. The establishment of the CCR is in an ideal position for us to consider the true cost
containment feature of an allowance reserve. Simple observation shows that even when the CCR was
active, prices continued to rise exponentially. Factors that may have affected the clearing price within
this time-frame are, for example, US legislation on regulating greenhouse gases, the realization of any
potential aggregate shocks as well as the tightening of the cap (reduced in 2014 and reducing by 2.5%
per annum for 2015-2020).18 Further, other possible explanations do exist. For example, if the trigger
price is reached, this may indicate that prices are likely to be at least as high in future auctions. Thus
firms may have an incentive to ‘hoard’ permits and, as a result, the entire CCR is exhausted.
Our predictions are also consistent with what occurred when the CCR was not activated. When
the trigger price is too large, for example as appears to be the case from auction 30 onwards, the CCR
appears to have no effect on the auction and we observe a decrease in price, which is a result of possible
demand reduction. Overall, by observing the regulator’s choice of trigger prices and size of allowance
18For a comprehensive analysis of factors affecting RGGI emissions and clearing prices see Murray, Maniloff, and Murray
(2014).
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reserve, we can conclude that there is a potential for a paradoxical result: the regulator, in an attempt to
contain prices may, in fact, increase auction clearing prices.
What is clear from our analysis is that for the CCR to work effectively the regulator needs to carefully
consider the choice of trigger price and the size of the allowance reserve. Having a sufficiently large
allowance reserve coupled with a trigger price that is sufficiently lower than firms’ permit values will
place upward pressure on auction clearing prices when the CCR is not activated. This may be a real
concern for policymakers: within RGGI the supply of permits in the auction, Q, is decreasing over time
whereas the CCR size is maintained at Q˘ = 10. Thus over time the CCR is become relatively larger
relative to the main auction supply with the associated upward pressure on the clearing price. On the
other hand, the trigger price has increased significantly (almost 25% per year from 2014-2018), which
increases the possibility of making the whole CCR irrelevant.
6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article is to investigate permit auctions with allowance reserves. A permit
allowance reserve is a fixed stock of permits that can be released by the regulator if the clearing price
reaches a threshold trigger price. Allowance reserves are justified due to their apparent assistance in
reducing prices within the permit market and, as a consequence, reducing the net present value of
compliance costs (e.g., Murray, Newell, and Pizer, 2009; Fell, Burtraw, Morgenstern, and Palmer, 2012).
In this article we model a uniform-price multi-unit auction with and without a permit allowance
reserve. We show that there is a class of symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria in which either the
allowance reserve reduces the clearing price to the trigger price or the allowance reserve generates
upward pressure on auction clearing prices. Consequentially, and paradoxically, an allowance reserve
with the aim of reducing clearing prices may actually do the opposite. Whether the allowance reserve
works as originally intended or places upward pressure on prices depends on the regulator’s choice of
trigger price and size of the allowance reserve. Lower trigger prices relative to firms’ permit values
and larger allowance reserves generate conditions where the introduction of an allowance reserve will
increase the clearing price. In terms of the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), our results
suggest that the regulator needs to pay close attention to their choice of trigger price and the size of the
Cost Containment Reserve (CCR). As the auction mechanism provides the market with price signals, a
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distortion within these prices may have substantial consequences for the RGGI auction and secondary
market.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. See Back and Zender (1993) Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose all other firms except firm i follow the demand schedule in (5). Then the residual supply
for firm i is the difference between the total available quantity and the sum of demands of all other
(n− 1) firms. We know that the total quantity could be any amount greater or equal to Q and up to Q¯,
depending on the initial clearing price. If the clearing price is less than p˜, then the total quantity would
be Q, and if the clearing price is greater but still less than p∗∗ then a proportion of the extra quantity
would be released. Finally, if the clearing price is greater or equal to p∗∗ then the total quantity Q¯ would
be released. Given this supply schedule the residual supply for firm i, x i(p), is as follows.
x i(p) =

Q¯ if p > ¯¯v,
Q¯
n

v¯−p∗∗
v¯−p

if p∗∗ < p ≤ ¯¯v,
Q†
n if p˜ ≤ p ≤ p∗∗,
Q
n

v¯−p∗
v¯−p

if p∗ < p < p˜,
Q
n if p = p
∗,
0 if r ≤ p < p∗.
(8)
If the price is higher than ¯¯v, no other firm demands any quantity and therefore the residual quantity for
firm i is the whole quantity. This is because even if the reserve quantity is released the final price never
falls below v. If the price is between p∗∗ and ¯¯v then the residual supply shown above is the result of the
subtraction of the demand on (n− 1) bidders (line two of (5)) from the total quantity Q¯ for such prices.
Firm i’s payoff is therefore,
pii = (v(si)− p)Q¯n

v¯ − p∗∗
v¯ − p

,
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which is decreasing in p for prices above p∗∗. Therefore, this term is maximized at p = p∗∗, where each
firm receives a quantity of Q¯n . The final clearing price would also fall to p˜.
For prices between p˜ and p∗∗, the reserve quantity will be released and always reduces the final
clearing price to p˜. In fact, in this scenario firm i can submit a demand anywhere between [0, Q¯n ], but
quantity Q¯n is the most desirable quantity. Now if p
∗ < p < p˜ the calculation for residual supply left for
bidder i gives us the equation in line four of (8). Then firm i’s payoff is,
pii = (v(si)− p)Qn

v¯ − p∗
v¯ − p

.
Again one can show firm i’s payoff is decreasing in p and the term is maximized at p = p∗. When p = p∗
firm i’s best response is to capture up to its share Qn . Firm i can demand any quantity between [0,
Q
n ], but
since the price is p∗ for any quantities, the firm obtains the maximum quantity, which is, Qn . At any price
lower than p∗ all permits would be demanded and no extra unit is available. Therefore, there are two
possible equilibria with final clearing prices of p∗ and p˜ and each firm receives Qn and
Q¯
n respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First, consider a standard uniform-price auction with Q units. From Proposition 1 we know there
is a class of equilibrium clearing prices p∗ < v where the allocated quantities to each firm is equal to Qn .
Consider any given equilibrium clearing price p∗ within this auction. Recall the equilibrium payoff of
each firm with p∗
pii = (v(si)− p∗)Qn .
Of course within this class, the preferred equilibrium price for the buyers is the one with the smallest p∗,
because they receive similar units in all cases. We want to show with the allowance reserve, there may
exist an equilibrium which is preferred to all the existing equilibria with p∗ < p˜ but it has a higher price
than all of them, that is, p˜.
Now suppose we introduce an allowance reserve with Q˘ extra units and a trigger price p˜ to the
auction. With the introduction of an allowance, if the initial clearing price is above p˜ then the extra units
will release until either the price reduces to p˜ or the extra units finishes. Let us focus on one particular
equilibrium where all the extra units are used and the equilibrium price is p˜. As we know from Theorem
23
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
1, the payoff of each firm in this case is,
pi′i = (v(si)− p˜)Q¯n .
If Q˘ is large enough, then pi′i could be larger than pii . In that case, the equilibrium with the clearing price
equal to p˜ will be preferred to all other equilibria with p∗ < p˜. Thus, the introduction of an allowance
reserve can increase the auction clearing price if the initial equilibrium price is low.
For the proof of the second part, note that from Theorem 1 we know that after the introduction of an
allowance reserve the highest equilibrium price within the class is p˜. Therefore, if the initial clearing
price without an allowance reserve is p˜ < p∗ < v, then after the introduction of the allowance reserve it
will come down to p˜. Also all firms are better off because they not only pay a lower price but receive a
larger quantity in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Given a value v, if there exists a pˆ ∈ [r, p˜) such that pˆ < v − Q¯Q (v − p˜), then an equilibrium
clearing price p˜ is Pareto dominated for firms by any clearing price less than or equal to pˆ.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The condition in this Lemma is the result of the comparison of the firms’ payoffs with a clearing
price less than p˜ and the best possible scenario that can happen with the release of the extra permits
(the full permit supply Q¯ to be released with the clearing price of p˜). So we need to have
(v − pˆ)Q
n
> (v − p˜)Q¯
n
,
and therefore, if
pˆ < v − Q¯
Q
(v − p˜),
then the buyers’ payoffs are higher for all clearing prices less or equal to pˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3
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Proof. First, rewrite the condition in Lemma 1 for the smallest possible equilibrium clearing price, the
reserve price, which is the worst outcome for the regulator:
r < v − Q¯
Q
(v − p˜). (9)
Now fix p˜ and quantities, then the right hand side would reach its minimum at v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜). So if the
regulator sets the reserve price such that it becomes greater than the minimum then by continuity, there
must be some v < v¯, which also makes the right hand side less than r. Therefore, if r > v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜),
then there exist a v˜ < v¯ such that we have
r = v˜ − Q¯
Q
(v˜ − p˜). (10)
For any value v ∈ [v˜, v¯], firms prefer the clearing price p˜ with the share of Q¯n permits. So there is a higher
chance of observing p˜ as the clearing price compared to any other clearing price p∗ ∈ [r, p˜). For the case
without allowance reserve, it has already been shown that for p∗ ∈ [r, v], the Pareto superior clearing
price is r.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The reserve quantity by definition is Q¯ −Q. If the regulator keeps almost all quantities as the
reserve then Q¯Q goes to infinity. Since v¯ is a positive finite number then we must have r > v¯ − Q¯Q (v¯ − p˜)
for any positive r. Now by continuity, there exists a Qˆ < Q¯, such that r = v¯ − Q¯
Qˆ
(v¯ − p˜). Therefore, the
regulator can set the reserve quantity to any amount greater than Q¯− Qˆ and guarantee the condition in
Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Given that the lowest clearing price is r in the event that the extra supply is not released we can
write the following objective function for a revenue maximizing regulator.
max
p˜
UR = Prob

r > v − Q¯
Q
(v − p˜)

p˜Q¯ +

1− Prob

r > v − Q¯
Q
(v − p˜)

rQ. (11)
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We can rewrite the above objective function as,
UR = Prob

v >
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘

p˜Q¯ +

1− Prob

v >
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘

rQ

(12)
This is equal to,
UR = (1− F(Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
))p˜Q¯ + F(
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
)rQ. (13)
Then the first-order condition becomes,
(1− F(Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
))Q¯− Q¯
Q˘
f (
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
)p˜Q¯ +
Q¯
Q˘
f (
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
)rQ = 0. (14)
This gives us,
(1− F( Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
))
f ( Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
)
=
Q¯p˜−Qr
Q˘
. (15)
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. According to the objective function in (12), the derivative with respect to r is always positive.
Thus, r must be set as large as possible, that is, equal to p˜.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. First, consider a standard uniform-price auction with Q units available for sale. Consider any
undominated equilibrium of this auction as the equilibrium aggregate demand D∗(vi , v−i) =
∑
i d
∗
i (vi , v−i).
According to Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka (2014), d∗i in any undominated equilibrium
is a downward sloping demand schedule. Therefore, the aggregate demand is also downward sloping.
Define p∗ as the equilibrium clearing price corresponded with D∗(vi , v−i). Now consider an auction with
an allowance reserve Q˘ ≡ Q¯−Q > 0 and a trigger price p˜ > r similar to the benchmark model.
Consider any equilibrium clearing price p∗ which is lower than the trigger price. If p∗ < p˜, we
essentially consider an equilibrium in which the clearing price in a standard uniform-price auction
without an allowance reserve is lower than the trigger price. We would like to show that an auction with
an allowance reserve Q˘ and p˜ > p∗ results in an equilibrium clearing price which is at least p∗. To see
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this, recall the payoff of a representative firm i in a standard uniform-price auction with Q units and a
clearing price p∗
pii(p
∗, vi) = (vi − p∗)di(p∗, vi), (16)
where di(.) is the demand schedule submitted by firm i. Thus firm i’s problem is to solve the following
constrained maximization:
max
p∗
pii(p
∗, vi) = (vi − p∗)di(p∗, vi), s.t.
∑
i
di(p
∗) = Q. (17)
When we introduce the allowance reserve into the auction the above maximization problem would be
different. In particular, if the initial price is above p˜ then the allowance reserve would be released until
either the price goes back to p˜ or the reserve finishes. So when firm i wants to maximize their profit, then
know for higher clearing prices the constraint is no longer the same, that is, the sum of demands for firm
could be up to Q¯ which is strictly greater than Q. Now take any equilibrium of a standard uniform-price
auction D∗(vi , v−i) =
∑
i d
∗
i (vi , v−i) with Q unit and p∗ < p˜. Firm i’s payoff is,
pii(p
∗, vi) = (vi − p∗)d∗i (p∗, vi), (18)
with
∑
i
d∗i (p∗) = Q. If we introduce the allowance reserve to this auction, obviously there is no incentive
for firm i to reduce the price: because a reduction in price would not release the new units, and given
that d∗i was the best response for Q units, it still remains the best response. Now consider a firm with a
realization of a value high enough, that is, greater than p˜. An increase in p∗ decreases the first term of
their payoff (vi− p∗), but if the price reaches p˜ then extra quantities will be available and the second term
of the payoff, d∗i (p∗, vi) could also increase. Therefore, there is only one way to break that particular
equilibrium and that is through an increase in price.
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